Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) document a significant increase in the difference between the earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for GAAP and Street (I/B/E/S) earnings over the 1990s, suggesting that the market has become increasingly reliant or fixated on Street earnings. In this study we investigate whether, alternatively, an "errors in variables" problem caused by a mismatch between the definitions of realized and expected earnings drives the ERC divergence. Our findings suggest that results from conventional analyses of GAAP and Street ERCs, including the ERC divergence pattern, are significantly contaminated by measurement errors in earnings surprises.
downward bias in GAAP ERC, both before and after the regime shift. Thus, the difference between the GAAP and Street ERCs is likely to be overstated for the entire time period.
We perform two sets of empirical analyses. First, we decompose GAAP and Street ERCs into two components, specifically, the covariance between stock returns and forecast errors, and the variance of forecast errors. Second, we estimate reverse regressions (i.e., we regress GAAP and Street forecast errors on unexpected stock returns), a classic remedy for mitigating measurement error bias (e.g., Collins and Kothari, 1989) . In the ERC decomposition analysis, three interesting observations emerge. First, we find an increased divergence in the difference between the variances of Street and GAAP forecast errors, which closely mirrors the ERC divergence pattern. Second, the source of the variance divergence stems primarily from a downward shift in the variance of Street forecast errors (with no apparent decline in the variance of GAAP forecast errors) in the early 1990s, around the time of I/B/E/S' regime shift. Third, unlike the temporal trend in the variance difference, we do not find a contemporaneous increase in the difference between Street and GAAP covariances; in fact, there is a mild decrease in the covariance difference, which works against finding the ERC divergence pattern. Overall, the observed ERC divergence appears to be driven solely by differences in the variances of GAAP and Street forecast errors. These results are consistent with: (1) a high level of noise in Street forecast errors, which translates into a downward bias in Street ERC, in the pre-regime shift period, and (2) a decrease in the noisiness of Street forecast errors after the regime shift, which mitigates the downward bias in Street ERC.
The reverse regression analysis shows no significant upward trend in the difference between the reverse Street and GAAP ERC coefficients. Specifically, when we regress unexpected stock returns on GAAP and Street forecast errors and an interaction term between forecast errors and a time trend variable, we find no significant difference between the Street and GAAP interaction terms. Recall that it is the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error that creates a spurious ERC divergence pattern. Hence, not finding increased divergence in the reverse ERCs is consistent with the previously documented ERC divergence pattern being attributable to the
I/B/E/S Adjustment Error.
Because the reverse regression approach mitigates both measurement errors, it is difficult to parse out the effects of removing only the GAAP Expectation Error. To shed light on the significance of GAAP Expectation Error, we estimate pooled and yearly reverse regressions for the subperiod that is likely to be free of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error, that is, the post-regime shift period (1993 to 2003) . For the pooled sample, we find that the reverse ERC difference remains statistically significant. This result is not surprising because, even absent the GAAP Expectation Error, we would expect to find a positive ERC difference as long as Street earnings exclude some transitory components from GAAP earnings. For the yearly regressions, however, we find that while the ERC difference (from the original regressions) is significant in all eleven years, the reverse ERC difference (from the reverse regressions) is significant in only five out of the eleven years (and only one out of five years from 1993 to1997). These results suggest that the GAAP Expectation Error has a significant effect on the documented ERC differences.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, our results provide insights on the source of the increased reaction to Street (over GAAP) earnings, as indicated by the documented ERC divergence. Specifically, we find that measurement errors in earnings surprises contribute significantly to this finding. Note that while Abarbanell and Lehavy (2006) also examine the ERC divergence pattern, our papers differ in at least two respects. Abarbanell and Lehavy show that a small number of extreme observations drive the divergence in ERCs, whereas we present evidence on the underlying cause of the observed divergence and provide a framework that formally describes the measurement errors in earnings surprises and their impact on GAAP and Street ERCs. Moreover, Abarbanell and Lehavy show the effect of excluding extreme observations on the first moment of the forecast error distribution (i.e., the mean effect), whereas our analysis demonstrates the importance of analyzing the second moment of the distribution (i.e., the variance effect). In particular, we find that the ERC divergence is largely attributable to the variance differences (as opposed to mean differences) between GAAP and Street forecast errors.
Second, our finding that the ERC divergence pattern stems from a decrease in the variance of Street forecast errors around the time of the I/B/E/S regime shift has important implications for any study that uses I/B/E/S forecast errors as an explanatory variable, especially for temporal and trend analyses that include the period prior to 1992 (e.g., Collins, Li, and Xie, 2005) . Specifically, ignoring the correction of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error would result in overstating the importance of other causes for the change in the regression coefficients on forecast errors, such as an increase in the information content of earnings. Future research that employs I/B/E/S forecast errors as a proxy for earnings surprises should therefore exclude the pre-1992 sample period to avoid biases introduced by the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error. 6 Lastly, the implications of the GAAP Expectation Error can be extended to any non-GAAP earnings figure (e.g., pro forma earnings). When I/B/E/S forecasts are used to proxy for the expectation of a non-GAAP earnings figure, the resulting non-GAAP ERC is subject to a downward measurement error bias. A possible avenue for future research is to explore the properties of other expectation proxies (e.g., a modified I/B/E/S forecast). For instance, future research may consider estimating reverse earnings-returns regressions to assess the measurement errors in alternative earnings surprise proxies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents our empirical propositions. Section 2 discusses our sample selection and variable definitions. Section 3 reports our empirical results and discusses implications for future research. Section 4 provides some robustness tests. Section 5 concludes.
Empirical Assessment of Measurement Error Biases
In the GAAP versus Street earnings literature, GAAP and Street earnings response coefficients (ERCs) are obtained by regressing stock returns on the two alternative measures of earnings surprises. In this section, we explore the potential biases introduced by using noisy measures of earnings surprises in estimating GAAP and Street ERCs.
An ERC is a regression coefficient estimate that is expressed as follows:
where FE denotes unexpected earnings (i.e., earnings surprise) and UR denotes the unexpected return associated with an earnings shock. If an earnings surprise is measured without error (FÊ=FE), the estimate of the ERC is unbiased:
However, if an earnings surprise is measured with error (i.e., FÊ =FE+η), the ERC estimate is biased toward zero:
7 Throughout the paper, we assume that the true unexpected earnings is uncorrelated with the measurement error, that is,
Measurement error in an earnings surprise can result from an error in either the realized or the expected earnings measure, that is, from a misalignment between either the realized value and its empirical counterpart, or the expectation and its empirical counterpart.
In the context of this study, there are two potential sources of error that could bias GAAP and Street ERCs: (1) a downward bias in Street ERC prior to the regime shift undertaken by I/B/E/S to correct for the misalignment between its definitions of reported (actual) and forecasted earnings (i.e., the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error), and (2) a downward bias in GAAP ERC for the entire sample period due to I/B/E/S forecasts being used as proxies for GAAP earnings expectations (i.e., the GAAP Expectation Error). We explore the implications of these two errors in the following stylized setting. Our main variables of interest are EPS GAAP and EPS Street , realized GAAP and Street earnings per share, respectively, where GAAP earnings is defined as Compustat's earnings before extraordinary items and Street earnings is given by I/B/E/S' earnings figure. The difference between the two measures, EPS Diff (i.e., EPS GAAP -EPS Street ), is the component excluded by the Street. In estimating earnings surprises, prior studies use earnings reported by I/B/E/S to proxy for Street earnings, and earnings forecasts provided by I/B/E/S to proxy for both GAAP and Street earnings expectations. However, from the discussion of measurement error above, if I/B/E/S' reported EPS measures are noisy estimates of realized values, or if I/B/E/S' forecasted EPS measures are noisy estimates of expected values, the empirical estimate for each earnings surprise measure consists of both a "true surprise" and a "measurement error" component. In the remainder of this section, we explore the implications of the two measurement errors on the estimated GAAP and Street ERCs.
I/B/E/S Adjustment Error: Misalignment between Actual and Forecasted I/B/E/S Earnings Prior to the I/B/E/S Regime Shift
The first type of measurement error-I/B/E/S Adjustment Error-stems from a misalignment between the realized value of Street earnings and its empirical counterpart, which introduces a bias into the estimated Street ERC. This error is related to the procedural and definitional changes (regime shift) undertaken by I/B/E/S in the early 1990s to correct for the misalignment between I/B/E/S' actual and forecasted earnings. Prior studies in the GAAP versus Street literature provide a detailed discussion of these changes. In particular, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) note that "conversations with I/B/E/S confirm that this break point [early 1990s] corresponds to the time during which they began actively redefining 'actual' earnings to exclude certain items." (Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002, p.52) . Similarly, Abarbanell and Lehavy (2006) mention that " [it] is clear from conservations with I/B/E/S officials that events in the early 1990s did cause procedural changes over the next year. These changes were designed to align more closely the definition of earnings to be forecasted by analysts to the definition of actual realized earnings." (Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2006, p.10) . However, these studies do not directly address the potential measurement error bias in estimated ERC values induced by the regime shift.
To illustrate the potential effects of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error, we first define the true Street earnings surprise as:
We make the following two assumptions in our stylized setting: (1) I/B/E/S forecasts (FEPS Street ) are a perfect proxy for Street earnings expectations at all times (i.e., FEPS Street = E(EPS Street )); (2) prior to I/B/E/S' regime shift, I/B/E/S' actual earnings correspond to GAAP earnings (EPS GAAP ) as opposed to Street earnings (EPS Street ). Below we summarize these assumptions and derive the estimated Street earnings surprise for the pre-regime shift period:
Pre-Regime Shift Period
Assumptions:
Empirical proxy for EPS Street = I/B/E/S' actual earnings = EPS GAAP Empirical proxy for E(EPS Street ) = I/B/E/S' forecasted earnings = FEPS Street FEPS Street = E(EPS Street ).
Estimated Street Earnings Surprise:
From the above, we see that the measurement error in the earnings surprise estimate is equal to EPS Diff , the difference between the realized GAAP and Street EPS (i.e., EPS GAAP -EPS Street ). This inequality is expected to hold at all times given that the expression on the left-hand side is the true ERC for Street earnings, while the expression on the right-hand side is a downward-biased ERC for excluded items. Estimated Street Earnings Surprise:
From the above, the post-regime shift Street earnings surprise is measured without error. Thus, after the regime shift the estimated earnings surprise coefficient is equal to its theoretical counterpart:
The bias introduced by the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error is consistent with the observed divergence pattern in ERCs, that is, the estimated Street ERC is biased downward prior to I/B/E/S' regime shift. As I/B/E/S corrects for the misalignment between actual and forecasted earnings, there is less measurement error in the Street's earnings surprise, and hence, the downward bias in Street ERC is alleviated. We formally summarize this discussion in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: The I/B/E/S Adjustment Error induces a downward bias in Street ERC in the pre-regime shift period. This downward bias is mitigated after the I/B/E/S regime shift. Thus, the temporal increase in the differences between Street and GAAP ERCs is overstated (i.e., the ERC divergence pattern is overstated). 
GAAP Expectation Error: Using I/B/E/S Forecasts to Proxy for GAAP Earnings Expectations
The second type of measurement error-GAAP Expectation Error-stems from a misalignment between the expected value of GAAP earnings and its empirical counterpart, which introduces a bias into estimated GAAP ERC. In particular, this error stems from the unavailability of GAAP earnings forecasts, which is a limitation faced by many studies in the GAAP versus Street earnings literature (as discussed in Bradshaw (2003) and Berger (2005) ). In the absence of a better proxy, the GAAP earnings surprise is measured as the difference between realized GAAP earnings and I/B/E/S' earnings forecast, despite the fact that the latter measure excludes certain items that are included in GAAP earnings.
To illustrate the potential bias induced by this error, we first define the true GAAP earnings surprise as follows:
True GAAP Earnings Surprise:
We again assume that I/B/E/S forecasts are a perfect proxy for Street earnings expectations (i.e., ≠ FE Street ). In particular, the measurement error in the GAAP earnings surprise estimate is equal to E(EPS Diff ), the expected difference between GAAP and Street EPS. The estimated GAAP earnings surprise coefficient is therefore biased downward and is equal to the following (both before and after the regime shift):
FEPS Street = E(EPS
Overall, the GAAP Expectation Error introduces a downward bias in ERC estimates for GAAP earnings and the bias persists over time. We summarize this discussion in our second proposition below:
Proposition 2: The GAAP Expectation Error induces a downward bias in GAAP ERC, both before and after the regime shift. Thus, the differences between Street and GAAP ERCs are overstated throughout the estimation period. Figure 1 illustrates the combined effect of the two biases.
The effect of the GAAP Expectation Error is illustrated in

Sample and Data
We derive 11 This definition of earnings excludes both extraordinary items and earnings from discontinued operations and is comparable to earnings numbers used in prior studies (e.g., Bradshaw and Sloan, 2002) . 12 Both GAAP and I/B/E/S EPS are scaled by stock price at the beginning of the quarter and converted to the same split-adjusted basis.
In the returns-earnings regression, we measure stock returns as the three-day buy-andhold return around quarterly earnings announcement dates minus the corresponding valueweighted market return. The resulting returns are winsorized at the 1 st and the 99 th percentiles
within each sample year. 13 Following Brown (2001), we use the last EPS forecast within the 90 days before the quarterly earnings announcement date to proxy for the market's expectation.
14 Accordingly, we define GAAP (Street) earnings surprises (hereafter, GAAP and Street forecast errors) as the difference between GAAP (I/B/E/S) EPS and the most recent analyst forecast, both scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the quarter. We obtain earnings announcement dates from I/B/E/S. 10 Our empirical results (presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3) are robust to using operating earnings (as in Bhattacharya et al., 2003) instead of earnings before extraordinary items. Total operating earnings is computed as GAAP basic earnings per share from operations (Compustat quarterly data item #177) multiplied by the number of basic shares outstanding (Compustat quarterly data item #15). 11 I/B/E/S' EPS value is adjusted for dilution if the corresponding GAAP EPS is calculated on a diluted basis. 12 Consistent with our definition of EPS GAAP , I/B/E/S' definition of earnings per share also excludes extraordinary items and earnings from discontinued operations (The I/B/E/S Glossary, 2001). 13 None of our results are sensitive to winsorization of returns or other variables. 14 If several earnings forecasts were issued on that particular date, we use the median value as an estimate. We choose to employ the most recent forecast of a single individual analyst to improve the accuracy and timeliness of the forecast (O'Brien, 1988) . Our results are robust to using the most recent consensus forecasts from I/B/E/S summary files.
Empirical Analysis and Results
Increased Reaction to Street (over GAAP) Earnings
We begin our analysis by replicating the documented increased divergence pattern in the ERC for Street and GAAP earnings. Similar to prior studies, we measure ERCs as the slope coefficients from yearly cross-sectional regressions of short-window market-adjusted returns on each of the two alternative forecast error measures. 15 As defined before, FE Street (FE GAAP ) is the difference between I/B/E/S actual EPS (GAAP EPS) and forecasted EPS. The results are reported in Table 1 . The first three columns correspond to analyses based on the full sample period (i.e., from 1985 to 2003). To allow for a direct comparison with prior studies, we also report results for the 1985 to 1997 subperiod in the last three columns. 16 Overall, results for the two sample periods are qualitatively and statistically similar; we therefore focus our discussion on the full sample results. Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) use long-window stock returns in their analyses, which they define as the buy-andhold returns from the two days after the last quarterly announcement through the day after the current-period earnings announcement. As a sensitivity check, we also compute long-window stock returns and report these results in Section 4.2. 16 Bradshaw and Sloan's (2002) Figure 2 . Overall, the results in this section are consistent with the market increasing its reliance, or fixation, on Street (over GAAP) earnings over the past decade, as documented by Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) . In the subsequent sections, we explore the extent to which the documented divergence between the two estimated ERCs is an artifact of measurement error biases, rather than a reflection of increased reliance or fixation on Street earnings.
Decomposing Earnings Response Coefficients (ERCs)
In this section, we provide preliminary evidence on the importance of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error and the I/B/E/S regime shift (that corrects the error) in producing a divergence pattern between Street and GAAP ERCs. Recall that prior to I/B/E/S' regime shift, the estimated Street ). If the elimination of the downward bias is responsible for the ERC divergence pattern, then we should observe a downward shift in the variance of the Street forecast error around the time of the regime shift.
17 Accordingly, we separately study the temporal changes in ERCs' two components: (1) the numerator -the covariance between the three-day abnormal return around a quarterly earnings announcement and the I/B/E/S or GAAP forecast error, and (2) the denominator -the variance of the forecast error.
We begin our analysis by plotting the forecast errors-returns covariances (hereafter, covariance is consistently higher than the Street covariance during the entire period, suggesting that a value-relevant component is included in GAAP earnings, but excluded from Street earnings (i.e., excluded by I/B/E/S). Further, we find a mild increase in the divergence between the two covariances that is in the opposite direction of the ERC differences.
Overall, our evidence suggests that the increased ERC divergence is solely attributable to a corresponding increased divergence in the difference between Street and GAAP forecast error
variances, which appears to be in part an artifact of the I/B/E/S regime shift. We find no significant contemporaneous increase in the covariance difference. Taken together, these results suggest that the documented ERC divergence pattern is due at least in part to decreased noisiness of Street forecast errors resulting from better alignment between the definitions of actual and forecasted earnings.
Reverse Earnings Response Coefficients (Reverse ERCs)
In this section, we extend the preliminary ERC decomposition evidence and employ a commonly used remedy for "errors in variables" problems in unexpected earnings, namely, reverse regression analysis (e.g., Beaver et al., 1987; Collins and Kothari, 1989) . Specifically, we regress earnings surprise measures for GAAP and Street earnings on unexpected returns. The slope coefficient from the reverse regression, which we refer to as reverse ERC (RevERC), is equal to:
where FE is unexpected earnings and UR is the unexpected return associated with the earnings shock. The reciprocal of the reverse ERC is an upward bound estimate for the original ERC. These two graphs stand in a stark contrast to the original ERCs graph presented in Figure 2 .
Specifically, we do not observe a drastic divergence pattern between the reverse Street and 18 Briefly, the expression for the reverse ERC is derived from: To complement the descriptive evidence discussed above, we perform regression analyses similar to those reported in Section 3.1 for the original returns-earnings regressions.
Specifically, we estimate pooled reverse earnings-returns regressions for both the full sample and the Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) 1985 to 1997 subsample with interaction dummies capturing time trends in reverse ERCs. Table 2 
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Recall that the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error induces a significant upward trend in the ERC difference; the GAAP Expectation Error simply overstates the average ERC difference given GAAP EPS differs from Street EPS. The analyses presented in Table 2 shed light primarily on the importance of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error. With respect to the GAAP Expectation Error, it is more difficult to empirically assess the extent to which the magnitude and the significance of the ERC difference are influenced by a downward-biased estimate of GAAP ERC. The difficulty 20 Changes in accounting standards in the early 1990s are a potential alternative explanation for the reverse regression results. Specifically, if the new accounting standards move towards fair-value accounting and thereby create more transitory items in GAAP earnings, estimating reverse earnings-returns regressions would remove not only the measurement error in forecast errors, but also the variance of the transitory component embedded in GAAP earnings. However, examining the accounting standards that became effective in the early 1990s, the first standard that may have a significant impact on GAAP earnings, SFAS 121, became effective in 1995, which is after the regime shift period. Moreover, such accounting changes would increase the variance of GAAP earnings without necessarily affecting the variance of Street earnings, an opposite pattern to the one observed in our ERC decomposition results.
is due to the fact that Street earnings likely exclude certain transitory (or less persistent) components from GAAP earnings, which, even absent the downward bias, can lead to a significant difference between GAAP and Street ERCs. Nevertheless, we attempt to provide some descriptive evidence on this issue by estimating original and reverse ERCs separately for the pooled sample and by year. To parse out the effect of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error, we focus our analysis on the post-regime shift subperiod, 1993 to 2003. We report the results in Table 3 .
The left (right) panel reports the ERC (reverse ERC) difference from the original (reverse)
regressions. While we continue to find a significant difference in the reverse ERCs for the pooled sample, the yearly reverse ERCs differences are significant in only five out of the eleven years.
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In contrast, the original ERCs differences are significant in all eleven years. Moreover, the significant reverse ERC differences are concentrated in the recent years, with relatively large differences between GAAP and Street earnings. Overall, this result provides descriptive evidence consistent with the GAAP Expectation Error being a significant driver of the average ERC difference.
Note that the results presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 are subject to the following caveats. First, our results for the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error are applicable only to those studies that use I/B/E/S earnings to proxy for Street earnings, not to those studies that use actual pro forma numbers from press releases, as the latter are not subject to the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error.
Second, while our results are consistent with measurement error being a primary driver of the documented increase in ERC differences, we acknowledge that other (non-mutually exclusive)
explanations (e.g., increased frequency of negative special items; change in accounting standards) may also play a role. 21 These results should be interpreted with caution because estimating reverse ERC for GAAP earnings removes not only the GAAP Expectation Error, but also part of the transitory GAAP component. Accordingly, the reduction in the magnitude of the difference between GAAP and Street ERCs is partly due to the transitory nature of earnings components excluded from the Street definition.
Implications for Future Research: Generalized Expectation Error
In our formalized framework, we focus on the properties of two specific measurement errors, the
I/B/E/S Adjustment Error and the GAAP Expectation Error. The I/B/E/S Adjustment Error is
mainly relevant to those studies that use I/B/E/S forecast errors to proxy for Street earnings surprises and examine the temporal trend in the information content of Street earnings over the 1990s. The GAAP Expectation Error, on the other hand, can be generalized to other non-GAAP earnings settings and hence has broader implications for studies that examine the information content of any non-GAAP earnings figure, such as pro-forma earnings (e.g., Bhattacharya et al., 2003) or Standard and Poor's "operating" earnings (e.g., Brown and Sivakumar, 2003) . In this subsection, we discuss the implications of our findings for assessing the information content of other non-GAAP earnings figures.
Recall that the GAAP Expectation Error is an error in the expected earnings component of GAAP earnings surprises. This "expectation error" arises because, absent a GAAP earnings forecast, researchers often resort to a second-best solution-using analyst's forecasts (provided by I/B/E/S or other forecast data providers) to proxy for GAAP earnings expectations. The same type of measurement error and corresponding downward bias in ERC will accompany any
GAAP or non-GAAP earnings surprise proxy as long as the definition of realized earnings (GAAP or non-GAAP) deviates from the definition of forecasted earnings provided by I/B/E/S
(or other commercial forecast data providers). To illustrate the properties of this generalized expectation error and the bias it introduces in ERC, we follow a framework that is similar to that presented in Section 1 and use pro-forma earnings (EPS PF ) as an example of non-GAAP earnings.
We first define the true pro-forma earnings surprise as follows: Assumptions:
Empirical proxy for EPS PF = Pro-forma earnings (from earnings releases) Empirical proxy for E(EPS PF ) = I/B/E/S' forecasted earnings = FEPS I/B/E/S FEPS I/B/E/S ≠ E(EPS PR )
Estimated Pro-Forma Earnings Surprise:
Note that the measurement error of the estimated pro-forma earnings surprise measure is very similar to that of the estimated GAAP earnings surprise. Its magnitude is likely to be less pronounced, however, because the definition of I/B/E/S forecasts is generally more closely aligned with the definition of pro-forma earnings than that of GAAP earnings. In other words, the expected difference between pro-forma and I/B/E/S EPS is likely smaller that that between GAAP and I/B/E/S EPS. Therefore, similar to the estimated GAAP ERC, the estimated proforma ERC is also biased downward, but to a lesser extent:
Again, the above example for pro-forma earnings can be generalized to any non-GAAP (and non-I/B/E/S) earnings figure. While it is not easy to derive a perfect expectation proxy for any GAAP or non-GAAP earnings specification, exploring other "second-best" expectation proxies (e.g., a modified I/B/E/S forecast that incorporates an expectation of the excluded items)
would be a fruitful avenue for future research. In particular, given our empirical findings future research may consider estimating reverse earnings-returns regressions to assess the measurement error bias of alternative earnings surprise proxies.
Sensitivity Analysis
Excluding Extreme Earnings Differences
A recent study by Abarbanell and Lehavy (2006) finds that the increased divergence between Street and GAAP ERCs is driven primarily by a small number of extreme observations with large mean differences between GAAP and Street forecast errors. Prima facie, this empirical result is consistent with the measurement error hypotheses proposed in our paper. Recall that the expressions for the measurement error bias introduced into both GAAP and Street ERCs depend on the difference between GAAP and Street EPS. It is possible that excluding observations with extreme observed forecast error differences coincidentally eliminates observations with large true EPS differences, which would mitigate (or eliminate) the measurement error bias. We explore this possibility by removing the "extreme negative tail of the earnings difference distribution," defined as the bottom quintile of the negative earnings difference observations in Abarbanell and Lehavy. 22 We find that while the resulting pattern of increased divergence in 22 Specifically, Abarbanell and Lehavy first sort all observations into three groups: zero, positive and negative earnings differences; they then rank the earnings differences within the positive group and within the negative group, separately, into quintiles. We would like to note that we find a lower incidence of zero differences in our sample than that reported in Abarbanell and Lehavy, probably because of differences in our measures of GAAP EPS. In particular, while we calculate GAAP EPS by dividing income before extraordinary item by the weighted ERCs becomes less pronounced, the upward trend in the ERC difference is still statistically significant. Additionally, the ERC decomposition and reverse regression analyses yield results that are qualitatively similar to those obtained for the full sample. In particular, ERC divergence is driven entirely by changes in the variance component of ERC, whereas the reverse regressions do not indicate increased divergence in ERCs. Overall, our results suggest that the measurement error bias is not eliminated by excluding extreme observations.
As discussed previously, while our conclusions are similar to those of Abarbanell and
Lehavy (2006) (2006) provide evidence on the effect of excluding these extreme observations on the first moment of the distribution (i.e., the mean effect) whereas our analysis demonstrates the importance of analyzing the second moment of the distribution (i.e., the variance effect).
Alternative Return Window
Our main ERC analysis is based on short-window returns around earnings announcement dates.
However, some of the evidence documented in prior literature on the differential market response to earnings in I/B/E/S and GAAP definitions is based on long-window returns. For average number of shares outstanding (see footnote 10), they use the Data 9 or Data 19 EPS figures from Compustat, which are generally accurate to the second decimal place. When we follow their approach to calculate GAAP EPS, we find very similar results. We therefore construct the negative earnings difference portfolio (i.e., the Portfolio 1 reported in Table 2 of Abarbanell and Lehavy) using their measure of GAAP EPS. In addition, we perform two alternative sensitivity tests by removing the extreme 5% or 10% observations on the left tail of the entire earnings difference distribution. Results from the three sensitivity tests are qualitatively and statistically similar. 23 Also, by excluding observations with the largest differences between observed Street and GAAP forecast errors, Abarbanell and Lehavy may omit firms that have valid reasons for excluding certain (less persistent) items, introducing potential sample selection bias into their research design.
instance, Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) use long-window stock returns for the interval beginning two days after the last quarterly earnings announcement date and ending the day after the current quarterly announcement date. We therefore investigate whether our results are robust to using long-window association tests between market-adjusted stock returns and the different earnings surprise metrics. The analyses (unreported) show that our results are qualitatively and statistically similar when long-term quarterly returns are used to compute ERCs, both for the original and the reverse earnings-returns regressions.
One of the benefits of using a long interval for returns estimation arises from the fact that longer windows allow one to capture the effects of any earnings pre-announcements. For example, Skinner (1997) finds that firms with negative earnings surprises are more likely to preannounce earnings and to do so within two weeks of the fiscal quarter-end. Note, however, that the main thrust of our analysis is based on the cross-sectional comparison between variables estimated with I/B/E/S versus GAAP earnings. Our emphasis on the relative magnitude of I/B/E/S earnings response coefficients, forecast error means, and variances, compared to the corresponding GAAP estimates, naturally controls for many contemporaneous confounding factors.
Sampling Error
The distribution of observations across our sample period is not uniform: the later years contain substantially more observations with the data necessary for our analyses. For example, the latest year in our sample (2003) has 11,496 observations, while the first year of the "shift" (1990) has 7,424 observations. In general, the pattern in the yearly composition for our sample is similar to the gradual increase in the number of observations over time observed in prior studies with similar data requirements (e.g., Abarbanell and Lehavy, 2006) .
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The change in the number of observations across years suggests an alternative explanation for the observed trend in the variances. Namely, the temporal reduction in sampling error resulting from the significant increase in the number of observations in our sample can lead to a decrease in the estimated variances for I/B/E/S-based forecast errors. To rule out this potential explanation, we randomly select an equal number of observations for each year of our sample, starting with 1988. We use 5,000 observations as the cutoff for each year of the sample.
All our results are robust to this sensitivity check.
Further, to ensure that the changes in the original and reverse ERCs are not caused by changes in sample composition, we conduct additional robustness tests for the 1989 to 1998 time period. 25 We replicate our analyses including only those firms that are present in each quarter of these ten years. The restricted sample consists of 310 firms and 12,400 firm-quarter observations.
All our results, including the original ERC divergence pattern, hold for this sample with constant firm composition.
Conclusions
We investigate whether the dramatic increase in the difference between the ERCs for GAAP and Street earnings documented in prior studies -a result that has sparked a debate about increased market fixation on Street earnings -is driven in part by measurement error in earnings surprise 24 Bradshaw and Sloan (2002) do not report observations in their study by year, and hence we cannot directly compare our sample size by year. We note that the number of firm-quarter observations in our sample from 1985 to 1997 (the sample period in their study) is 112,962, which is reasonably similar to that in Bradshaw and Sloan (98,647 firm-quarter observations). 25 Requiring a constant sample composition for the entire sample period (i.e., 1985 to 2003) results in a prohibitively small number of observations, and we therefore conduct the robustness test using a shorter sample period (i.e., 1989-1998) . We also construct an alternative sample by retaining firms that are present in 16 (64) proxies. Specifically, we explore two biases, (1) a downward bias in Street ERC arising from an inconsistency between I/B/E/S' definition of actual and forecasted earnings (i.e., I/B/E/S Adjustment Error), in the early 1990s, before I/B/E/S undertook a regime shift to correct the error, and (2) a downward bias in GAAP ERC arising from using I/B/E/S forecasts to proxy for GAAP earnings expectations (i.e., GAAP Expectation Error).
By decomposing ERCs into their covariance and variance components, we first establish that the increased difference between Street and GAAP ERCs is driven solely by the variance effect. This result, along with an apparent downward shift in the variance of Street forecast errors in the early 1990s, suggests that the ERC divergence pattern is at least partially attributable to the correction of the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error. Results from reverse earnings-returns regression analysis provide further support for this finding. In particular, we do not find a significant increase in the difference between the reverse GAAP and Street ERCs over our sample period. 
Appendix
In the Appendix, we explore the properties of the estimated ERCs from the reverse GAAP and Street earnings-returns regressions in a stylized two-period setting. Specifically, we determine conditions under which the reverse regressions provide unambiguous inferences about the ERC divergence trends. We use the same notation as in Section 1, as summarized in the following Estimated reverse GAAP and Street ERCs from reverse earnings-returns regressions, respectively
As in Section 1, we assume that I/B/E/S forecasts are perfect proxies for Street earnings expectations at all times (i.e., In the presence of "I/B/E/S Adjustment Error" and "GAAP Expectation Error," the slope coefficients from the reverse regressions of earnings surprise proxies on returns take the following forms in the first period (prior to I/B/E/S' regime shift) and the second period (after the regime shift): 
Sources of Bias:
As we discuss in Section 1, the estimated reverse ERCs (RevÊRC Street and RevÊRC GAAP )
are not influenced by the classic measurement error in earnings surprises. However, they are not free of bias, i.e., the reciprocals of reverse ERCs still deviate from the "true" unbiased ERCs. In other words, only when both earnings surprises and returns are measured without error (i.e., when the relationship between earnings surprises and returns is deterministic) are the true ERCs equal to the reciprocals of the reverse ERCs.
There are two sources of bias that are embedded in the expressions in Table A1 . The first source of bias stems from the error term ε, which captures the measurement error in returns. We refer to this bias as the "error-term bias"; it has a downward direction in both RevÊRC GAAP and
RevÊRC Street in both periods. In Table A1 , we denote this bias component as "A1" for GAAP ERC and as "A2" for Street ERC. The second source of bias, referred to as the "I/B/E/S bias," affects only RevÊRC Street in the first period. This bias component, denoted as "B" in Table A1 , is related to the I/B/E/S Adjustment Error that we discuss in Section 1. Recall that the measurement error in the Street earnings surprise proxy is equal to EPS Diff before the I/B/E/S regime shift.
Since the unexpected portion of EPS Diff is correlated with unexpected returns (UR), measurement error creates an upward bias in RevÊRC Street , and consequently, a downward bias in the reciprocal of reverse Street ERC in period 1 (and not period 2). In short, the estimates are biased upward for GAAP ERC in both periods and for Street ERC in period 2, but the overall direction of bias for Street ERC in period 1 is unclear.
To illustrate how the potential bias on the estimated reverse ERCs may affect the trend in the difference between the reciprocal reverse ERCs, we assume that the true unbiased ERCs and covariances remain constant across the two periods, that is, absent any bias, the difference between the true GAAP and Street ERCs is constant. We plot the true ERCs and the estimated ERCs in Figure A1 . The dotted and solid lines in Figure A1 connect true ERCs and inferred ERC estimates (i.e., reciprocals of reverse ERCs), respectively, before and after the I/B/E/S regime shift. The reciprocals of reverse ERCs always deviate from the true ERC values, with bias magnitudes A1, A2, and X corresponding to the expressions from Table A1 .
Next, we argue that two propositions regarding possible bias-induced patterns hold: (1) the magnitude of the bias for the reciprocal of the reverse Street ERC is larger than its counterpart for GAAP ERC in the period after I/B/E/S's regime shift, and (2) the slope of the trend for the reciprocal of reverse Street ERC is always larger than the corresponding slope for GAAP ERC estimate. Taken together, these two propositions imply that potential biases in the reverse regressions design would work against finding an insignificant difference in ERCs and ERC trends. In terms of the bias expressions summarized in Table 1A , each proposition is equivalent to a corresponding inequality:
(1) "Inequality 1": A1(after shift) < A2(after shift);
(2) "Inequality 2": A1(after shift)-A1(before shift) < A2(after shift)-X(before shift).
Inequality 1 holds at all times, since the following two conditions are satisfied always: 27 Turning to Inequality 2, we first show that it holds when the variance of the error term, ε, is constant over time. In that case, A1(after shift) = A1(before shift) and A2(after shift) = A2(before shift) > X(before shift), 28 and thus Inequality 2 is equivalent to comparing zero to a positive value. Next, we show that Inequality 2 also holds 27 We make the restrictive assumption that FE Diff is uncorrelated with FE Street . 28 The latter inequality holds following the chain of arguments below:
[ ] if the variance of the error term, ε, increases over time. In that case, first note that A2(after shift) -A2(before shift) < A2(after shift) -X(before shift), since X(before shift) < A2(before shift). All that is left to show is that A1(after shift) -A1(before shift) < A2(after shift) -A2(before shift).
Recall that we assume that true ERCs and true covariances and variances are constant over time.
Therefore, the latter inequality can be expanded into (the subscripts "before" and "after" refer, respectively, to error terms before and after the I/B/E/S regime shift): 
As noted previously, the last inequality holds at all times since
In short, the first proposition holds at all times, and the second proposition holds when the variance of the error term, ε, is constant or increasing. Conceptually, the variance of the error ε is proportional to the amount of information received by the market from sources unrelated to accounting earnings. Therefore, the assumption of increasing error variance is consistent with the evidence from prior research on the market increasingly using information not summarized by bottom-line numbers, as well as the overall increase in idiosyncratic return volatility (e.g. Francis et al., 2002; Campbell et al., 2001; Rajgopal and Venkatachalam, 2005) .
Overall, the direction of the biases is in favor of finding a significant divergence pattern in the reciprocals of reverse ERCs. Put differently, the potential biases in the estimated reverse ERCs are against finding the documented empirical results, that is, an insignificant increase in the difference between the estimated reverse ERCs, and hence, the reciprocal of the reverse ERCs. Street ERC is a slope coefficient from a regression of a 3-day buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns around earnings announcement date on forecast error computed as I/B/E/S earnings per share minus the most recent I/B/E/S forecast issued before earnings announcement date (within a 90 days period) scaled by beginning of the quarter share price. GAAP ERC is a slope coefficient from a regression of a 3-day buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns around earnings announcement date on forecast error computed as GAAP earnings per share minus the most recent I/B/E/S forecast issued before earnings announcement date (within a 90 days period) scaled by beginning of the quarter share price. Street reverse ERC is a slope coefficient from a regression of Street forecast error on 3-days returns. GAAP reverse ERC is a slope coefficient from a regression of GAAP forecast error on a 3-day returns. P-values for differences between ERCs and reverse ERCs are reported in parentheses. 
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